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Introduction:
The Arab Spring has had noticeable effects on twelve countries spanning from within
North Africa to the Middle East including: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman and Kuwait. Not only did the movement spark riots and
protests, but the events also led to reforms in government and the removal of oppressive tyrants
in countries like Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Egypt. There are theories as to why the reactions in
certain countries, like the aforementioned, were intensified in comparison to those with less
political and social upheaval, like in Bahrain, Kuwait or Jordan.1 Many authors suggest the
intensity of uprisings is dependent upon these underlying factors: economic hardship,
government corruption, and inflation of social media outlets like Twitter or Facebook. However,
other social scientists deeply consider the youth bulge, disenfranchisement of religious sects,
tribal differences, rising unemployment, and the use of technology as a uniting tool as factors of
the Arab Spring. Other authors similarly attribute the Arab Spring to intertwined causes of
economic, social, political, juridical, and diplomatic problems that all contributed to the massive
uprisings and revolution that became the Arab Spring.2 In addition to these disparities, the
Middle East lacked institutions willing to invest in the education and progress of the Arab-youth.
The majority of investments made by Western countries centered on oil, gas, and other economic
gains.3 If these factors are indeed the root of the revolutions and sequence of events that we
recognize as the Arab Spring, there are a few lingering questions that this paper aims to address.
This paper will explore and evaluate how the Arab Spring took hold in certain countries
and the reasons it did not have as grand of an effect in others. Moreover, this paper will move to
Anderson, Lisa. "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya." Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 2-7.
2 Pollack, Kenneth M., Byman, Daniel L., and Al-Turk, Akram. 2011. The Arab Awakening : America and the
Transformation of the Middle East (1). New York, NY, US: Brookings Institution Press.
3 Pollack and Byman and Al-Turk, “The Arab Awakening.”
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evaluate the cross-national similarities and political patterns of those nations with Eritrea,
specifically why the Arab Spring failed to lead to shifting Eritrea’s political climate. Lastly, I
will investigate the possibilities of what Eritrea would have needed to successfully achieve
variant levels of success, as the twelve countries most affected by the Arab Spring. In order to
discover these possibilities, there will be research covering what Eritrea uses as its main
mediums of suppression and how they relate to the Arab countries.
The paper itself is split into three sections beginning with a chapter that defines the Arab
Spring, then moves into exploring the specific countries involved by comparing how far the
methods of revolt progressed in a cross-national analysis. This includes the brief history of the
North African and Middle Eastern countries most affected by the series of uprisings and political
dissent. In evaluating each nation and research conducted through peer-reviewed journal articles,
accredited scholarship and drawing comparisons through the cross-national chart, the chapter
will explain why the Arab Spring succeeded where it did, and inversely why it was not as
successful elsewhere.
The second chapter will study the origins of Eritrea from colonial rule to liberation to the
modern state and investigate the distribution of power or lack of that keeps the government
centralized. In doing so, this section will highlight how the government has risen to power from
its former liberation guerrilla army and how the prohibition of separate political parties has
allowed the standing government’s domination over all sectors engulfing public life. This
includes socially conforming citizens to continue the legacies of the culture that existed prior to
liberation, which will be discussed in the “Nakfa Principles.” This lens into Eritrea’s
governmental structure will address the infamous conscription, otherwise known as national
service, and how legislation has cemented its role in the lives of Eritrean citizens through the
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Yikaelo-Warsay Campaign. While examining the logistics of conscription, this chapter aims to
address how service has been framed as an inescapable and inherent civic duty of each citizen,
and offers a cross-national comparative chart with the twelve Arab-speaking nations involved in
the Arab Uprisings to provide an analyzing lens into the use of conscription in these
administrations and how those that implement the practice closely resemble authoritarian
regimes. In addition, this chapter will emphasize the root of Eritrea’s refugee exodus, which is
overwhelmingly composed of the youth, and contrast who remains in Eritrea and the relevance
of the remaining vulnerable population with the population that was able to incite dissent and
peaceful protests within the Arab nations. Furthermore, this chapter will make the argument for
why Eritrea is in fact comparable to its regional counterparts through the discussion of its shared
religions, languages, lack of pluralism, multi-ethnic composition, social, economic and political
characteristics. All in all, this chapter will strengthen the link between Eritrea with its North
African counterparts as opposed to homogenizing it with the entirety of the Middle East.
The third and final chapter will discuss the main mediums of suppression in Eritrea and
how the government has ultimately secured its power against any internal resistance,
consequently discouraging organized opposition or vocalized dissidents within its borders. To do
so, the chapter will research Eritrea’s policies and implementations surrounding freedom of
religion, freedom of independent press, freedom of assembly, the role of civil society, and the
freedom of Eritreans to enter and exit the country and provide detailed case study of the ‘G-15’,
and examples of what repercussions citizens face when violating the societal norms of the
aforementioned categories. Why does this matter? By highlighting the level of scrutiny that
ordinary citizens face when expressing personal liberties and human rights as those mentioned
above, the nature of a government is exposed and the more restrictive, the more likely the
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government is acting as an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Eritrea’s governance is relevant in
comparison to those of the Arab Spring because authoritarian regimes and lack of good
governance played significant roles in fueling the organized civil social and political upheaval
observed in North Africa and the Middle East starting in 2011.
This final chapter will also address why political or social upheaval regarding Eritrea is
produced amongst the Eritrean diaspora and expatriates. What are the lengths of censorship and
why is there no scholarship available regarding opposing views within Eritrea’s borders? Why is
this relevant to the Arab Spring? There are many arguments for why the Arab Spring has
occurred and who it has affected but scholars have failed to draw the link between countries that
are experiencing similar or worse conditions and this is reflected in the case of Eritrea. This
chapter aims to examine Eritrea leading up to the Arab Spring and adequately address the
underlying reasons that Eritrea has not faced a revolution since its independence. Eritrea is an
anomaly amongst the countries in the Horn of Africa, from enduring a 30 years-long war for
liberation with Ethiopia after previously being subjected to a sequence of Ottoman, British,
Egyptian, Italian rule – to being ruled by the same administrator and overseer for over 25 years.
It is imperative that these connections are made exposing how open political thought and speech
are restricted in less-democratic nations and the significance that censorship has in both the Arab
nations and Eritrea. Eritrea was born through struggle but more importantly, its citizens
demanded freedom from their oppressors and sought a nation that was ultimately freer and
centered on unity through a shared national identity. Similarly, the Arab nations hoping to form
alternative political systems that would stabilize basic human rights, lessen censorship, seek
democracy while upholding individual freedoms were the same countries that participated in the
Arab Uprisings.
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This paper argues the underlying reasons that Eritrea has been unable to participate in the
Arab Spring, starting with its notorious military conscription or national service program,
fastening what is left of Eritrea’s youth and simultaneously sparking the refugee exodus from
Eritrea. In addition to providing insight into why Eritrea’s population is diminishing, this paper
will make the argument that the citizens’ fear of punishment has sparked self-censorship and
distrust that was not as widespread in its Arab counterparts that experienced neighboring
populations engulfed in similar uprisings, disrupting the systems of oppressions in place. These
arguments aim to raise awareness of Eritrea’s political climate and how it has been stunted in its
transition towards democracy.
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Chapter 1:
This chapter will argue what the major drivers of the Arab Spring were. It will prove that
the uniting factor of the Arabs fighting against their governments was the desire for freedom and
the hope to finally escape the cycle of authoritarian rulers. There is a glamorized role associated
with the social media and simultaneous youth bulge within the respective countries involved.
These Arab-speaking nations had revolutions that were able to happen because of the resources
and varying intense relations between citizens and their government. In certain countries like
Algeria and Saudi Arabia, the regimes could be united under a strong central government. In
more destabilized countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, they were less centralized and unable
to unite under a stable government. In many countries, revolutions are unable to happen because
of the tight control and strict enforcement of the government. But what happens when there is
instability and unrest? When the government and the people cannot see eye to eye? When the
people’s desires are unfulfilled by the government and the people demand change? The
outcomes of the nations involved in the Arab Uprisings were unexpected and this section will
evaluate each respective nation’s experience in depth to better understand their outcomes.
Additionally, this section will argue that the Arab Spring was a compilation of organized
political and social responses whose outcomes were largely shaped by each government’s
restrictions of personal and civil liberties in each local context. The countries that failed to
remove their dictators and were quickly silenced are the same nations that experienced heavy
online censorship, a lack of multiple political parties and assemblies, as well as comparatively
wealthier economies with rulers that were able to manipulate appeasing legislation for their
constituents. The countries that successfully removed their heads of state experienced similar
suppressions of political and individual rights; however, the aforementioned countries had poorer
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economies and their governments were prone to turmoil as a result of disintegration with other
forms of authority, not limited to the military and security apparatus. This paper will not predict
what the Arab countries that did not successfully revolt needed to reach change, but instead, it
aims to address misconceptions of what led to the successes and failures in each nation involved
and why understanding the multiple mediums of suppression involved is relevant.
What is the Arab Spring?
Scholars have observed the slue of Arab uprisings that began in 2011 and have received a
spectrum of names, ranging from: the Arab Spring, Arab Uprisings, Arab Upheavals, Arab
Awakening, etc. Some scholars separate each country’s experience, i.e.: Tunisia’s Uprisings,
Egypt’s Uprisings, etc. This paper will refer to the culmination of events that transpired in North
Africa and subsequently, the Middle East as “The Arab Spring” and “The Arab Uprisings”,
interchangeably. Much like author Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, this paper aims to delve deeper
into what connects the events that transpired throughout the Arab world: “The Arab uprisings
represent a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that swept the Arab world.”4
Although this definition Salih gives explains the experience of the collectivity of countries
involved, it falls short of explaining what linked the revolutions and uprisings, along with what
sustained the events in each various local context or country. However, Salih goes further to link
the protests in these Arab countries through their use of the same techniques of resistance, which
included strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies. A big source of contention has been the
role and influence of social media throughout the Arab Spring. “Particularly pivotal to protest
process as well has been the use of social media to organize, communicate, raise awareness, and
issue danger alerts among the thousands of protestors in the face of state attempts at repression,

Osman Salih, Kamal Eldin. 2013. "THE ROOTS AND CAUSES OF THE 2011 ARAB UPRISINGS." Arab Studies
Quarterly 35, no. 2: 184-206. Religion and Philosophy Collection.
4
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internet censorship, crowd control and even physical attack…”5 Social media served as a vehicle
for communication; however, the methods and forums used in each country varied based on the
events that needed publicity or in certain situations, warnings. In order to grasp how instrumental
these tools were, the importance of the various local contexts arises, requiring one to deconstruct
what events shaped the country and inhabitants’ relationship with certain media. Not only have
the demonstrators and countries involved in the Arab Spring been linked by their techniques and
risk of penalty, but they also shared a uniform slogan in such a time of despair and revolution.
The people in the streets would yell, “Ash-sha’b yurid isqat an-nizam: The people want to bring
down the regime.”6 There were clear levels of contempt that fueled these uprisings until regimes
were either dismantled or even more suppressive of their citizens, which is why it is necessary to
define what rights were accessible in each nation.
Another trait that unified the people who fought in the streets and against the corrupt
regimes was the respect of religion. The countries within North Africa and the Middle East have
largely been connected through the recognition of a shared religion: Islam; however, there are
Christian and other religious minorities that exist within these areas. Although not all religious,
the people organized what would be known as “the largest, most organized demonstrations” as
the “days of rage” and these would take place on Fridays after Juma, otherwise known as
afternoon Friday prayer.7 However, just as one is able to observe these similarities, it is
important that scholars understand and respect the differences each country faced in its
opposition’s attempt to attain justice and a change in government, which is why some scholars
refrain from referring to the period of regional unrest as the Arab Spring. In a comparison to the
European revolutions of 1848, Anne Applebaum writes:
Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
7 Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
5
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Each revolution must be assessed in its own context, each had a distinctive
impact. The revolutions spread from one point to another. They interacted
to a limited extent. … The drama of each revolution unfolded separately.
Each had its own heroes, its own crisis. Each therefore demands its own
narrative.8 (185)
While the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya each navigated through a change or resignation in
leadership in varying ways, one can conclude that Tunisia was the catalyst for the entirety of the
Arab Uprisings and it is pivotal to understanding the latter rebellious movements. Applebaum
referenced this excerpt from a text focusing on the European revolutions of 1848 to highlight the
state of despair reflected in what has garnered global attention – a “complicated and messy”
situation that so closely mirrors history. This excerpt also goes to provide the counterargument as
to why there is a divide amongst scholars that recognize the regional unrest as combined or
interlaced events versus those that recognize each instance within each respective nation
separately. Salih compares scholars like Anne Applebaum and Mohammed Farazmand’s
interpretations and analysis of the Arab uprisings to provide a holistic lens as to the new Arab
identity that has emerged amongst those in the Middle East and North Africa. Salih examines
Mohammed Farazmand’s article “The Nature of 2011 Arab Uprisings: A Comparative Analysis”
claiming “a new Arab political identity with an anti-despotic, pluralist and democracy-seeking
approach is dawning.”9 Spectators, news outlets, and the West have observed these
developments that grew out of the Arab Uprisings, often witnessing a clear divide between the
elites in Arab nations and the overwhelming youth population that is far more disadvantaged
than the former.
8

Applebaum, Anne. 2011. "The Arab Revolutions of 2011 are more like Europe in 1848, not 1989," Slate,
accessed April 26, 2017.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/02/every_revolution_is_different.html.
9 Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
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Although several social scientists accredit the build up of these events to the influx of
economic hardship, government corruption, suppression of individual liberties, and overall
disenfranchisement, considering the population within the Arab-speaking nations that were the
most impacted is critical for painting the framework of why these events took place and what
unites them. Not only was the distinction between the elites and youth during this time clear, but
as was the ongoing accumulation of wealth by the elites in contrast with the continual cycle of
unemployment and borderline poverty for the Arab youth who were the majority in their
homelands. The ruling elites obtained security through corruption, and they also made sure to
find ways to ensure the continuity of their legacies through nepotism and brute force. These
illegitimate regimes continued the practices of “…adopted policies that consolidate absolute rule,
pave the way for succession within the family framework, and secure in a systematic way
economic and social discrimination as well as political exclusion along ethnic and sectarian
lines.”10 Similar to other forms of patronage or the spoil system that was formerly used in the
United States, the regimes of Algeria, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other nations where the line of
power has been retained within family lineage has made it easier for these same governments to
remain in power in the midst of arising crises. These same members of the ruling class and social
elites have been able to endure financial and economic instability that handicaps the lower
classes and the unemployed as the former have already secured stability and securitization
through the governments they choose to support. The demographic build up of these countries
are not majority elite, they are in fact disproportionately composed of disenfranchised youth that
struggle to survive in the midst of programs sponsored by international financial institutions like
the IMF or the World Bank. These same international institutions impose “economic
liberalization programs” such as the “Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)” that allow the
10

Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
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government to halt subsidies that had previously been offered to those with lower incomes within
their nations, and consequently, the same citizens that make up the majority of the populations
are the same ones who are unable to afford common goods and foods in the midst of staggering
rises in food prices. This has been observed as especially common amongst the youth, which
have been credited at the forefronts of many of the nations that participated in the Arab
Uprisings. In the midst of this argument, it is relevant that scholar Salih acknowledges the youth
as “…the youth below age 25 who represent approximately 65 percent of the total population of
the Arab world.”11 There are shared lived experiences and cultural practices that existed prior to
the emergence of a “new Arab political identity” which continues to unite those in the Middle
East and North Africa, not limited to shared religions, languages, ethnic groups, and outcomes of
government interactions with more developed nations in the West that base policies around
furthering economic and political priorities.
What was different in North Africa?
When the Arab Uprisings began, the governments of Tunisia and Egypt collapsed much
quicker than Libya or Yemen. Tunisia and Egypt were both heavily military operated states, and
when the militaries shifted to supporting the uprisings instead of the rulers of the regimes, there
were vigorous changes that counteracted the powers held by the former presidents in Tunisia and
Egypt. Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak both minimized the
military’s level of control and political status as well as appointing businessmen and government
officials, otherwise known as elites, to positions that would inevitably neutralize each nation’s
military.12 In the case of Libya, the uprisings were not as swift as Tunisia and Egypt, especially
as it garnered international attention and interventions. The ruling class went as far as hiring
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Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
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African mercenaries that were provided by Israel13, which only heightened the atrocities
committed under the Gaddafi regime. Each of the leaders of these nations received varying levels
of support or resilience from their militaries and neighboring countries, which in turn affected
the duration of the revolutions.
The next country to successfully remove its dictator was Libya; however, Libya’s
political climate and tribal divisions varied from those of Tunisia or Egypt. In regard to Libya,
the mass mobilization of civilians who were from the west, Cyrenaica, and the east, Tripolitania,
had varying responses to the protests and if they would remain loyal to Muammar Gaddafi.14
Whereas in Egypt and Tunisia, there was not a substantial number within an elite class [willing]
to support the dictators, like in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or even Libya. A notable difference in the
case of protest in Libya is that the major protest in Benghazi resulted in the Libyan army opening
fire on its disgruntled citizens. The brute actions of Libya’s government triggered a response
from Western powers as a broad international effort, specifically the United States and NATO
members, interfered and led a military intervention. The 6-7 month conflict led to the death of
former leader Muammar Gaddafi, and yet another removal of leadership amongst the Arab
nations in North Africa.
Although the immolation in Tunisia is considered the impetus of the Arab Spring, the
outrage and consistent neglect of the country’s overwhelmingly rural inhabitants fueled the
widespread demonstrations. In fact, it was the organized labor movement that resonated with the
youth decades later. The levels of corruption in Tunisia were evident by the infamous network
known as “the Family” in Tunisia. “The Family” referred to “…more than half of Tunisia’s
commercial elites that were personally related to Ben Ali through his three adult children, seven
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Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
Pollack and Byman and Al-Turk, “The Arab Awakening.”
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siblings, and second wife’s ten brothers and sisters”15. Besides the transparent patronage that
allowed the benefits of the ruling class to be shared amongst themselves, the rest of Tunisia had
still been grappling with the lack of resources they had been receiving. Contrary to the
experiences in Libya and Egypt, Tunisia’s revolution did not rely heavily on the interaction with
its military. 16 As the first country to experience uprisings, Tunisia’s experience was far more
disorganized and sporadic; although, the repeated strikes of the labor movement solidified how
instrumental the strikes were in fueling the protests to come.
Tunisia had been a popular travel destination, manipulated by the government to present
a façade of a tourist-friendly country that was sustainable, but this only added fuel to the groups
that were organizing revolts. Namely, the Islamists within Tunisia that unified masses under
religion shouted claims that the government was essentially “prostituting the country for foreign
exchange….”17 It is indicative that the religious extremists were able to garner support amongst
locals against the unfavorable tourism and rapidly expanding Western interactions. Tunisia,
however, is just one of the African countries that was able to incite a successful rebellion. The
uproar was a unified response to the myriad of restrictions on civil liberties, imprisonment of
political activists and journalists, limited academic freedom, and poor governance. The lack of a
centralized government benefitted the protesters in the midst of the wave of anti-despotic
uprisings while illuminating the divergent economic reservations of Tunisians in comparison to
their regional counterparts in Egypt and Libya.
When observing Morocco, the legitimacy held by the state is a direct result of the
relationship of the King with God and the State of Morocco. In fact, Larbi Sadiki writes in depth
Anderson, Lisa. 2011. "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya." Foreign Affairs, 2011. 2.
16 Anderson, “Demystifying”.
17 Anderson, “Demystifying”.
15
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covering the interconnected relationship that King Mohammed is able to maintain. Sadiki’s
article deconstructs the power levels and relationship between authority and citizens throughout
North Africa. Specifically, he refers to Morocco as having a “holy trinity”18. “The King, referred
to as the “Commander of the faithful” because of the claim that he is a direct descendent of the
Prophet of Islam. This gives him legitimacy…”19 Sadiki’s claims indicate that the citizens of
Morocco prioritize the hierarchy of religion within society above all else. Furthermore, he is
equating the obedience to the authoritarian ruler to an innate submission to Islam or Allah. He
writes, “Hence, the king occupies a distinctive position within the Moroccan political system and
any dissent or questioning of the king’s authority is by implication a reject of Islam and may be
considered treason.”20 There is no other king or monarch or dictator that reigned during the
uprisings that began in 2011, who has linked his lineage to the Prophet of Islam, Prophet
Mohammed. Although, the rigid force of assuming one’s self innately related to an idol is a
manipulation of ideology that has maintained the highest level of rule observed in Morocco.
These claims scratch the surface of why Morocco’s experience was vastly incomparable to those
of its rebelling neighbors. The experiences of monarchial Arab regimes included collectively
resisting opposition through strong political, military and economic union – which explains why
countries like Morocco and Jordan were invited to join the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC).21 Those who are able to make the necessary changes to survive and thrive in rapidly
changing conditions are the same ones who are able to prosper. This is an accessible advantage
to the ones making the changes to the systems of oppression at hand.

Sadiki, Larbi, and Youcef Bouandel. 2016. "The Post Arab Spring Reform: The Maghreb at a Cross Roads."
DOMES: Digest Of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1: 109-131.
19 Sadiki and Bouandel, “Post Arab Spring”, 109-131.
20 Sadiki and Bouandel, “Post Arab Spring”, 109-131.
21 Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
18
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During the Arab Spring, King Mohammed VI of Morocco made sure to implement
reforms that appeared prudent, yet they were acts to ensure he would still hold power. For
instance, Sadiki’s text aims to reveal that King Mohammed VI instigated a somewhat quasi
revolution, which entailed redistributing roles of power and authority within the government to
the members of the traditional opposition.22 The people of Morocco had not led the same levels
of protests and outcries for a change in leadership, but the King responded proactively to the
rising levels of disdain amongst the citizens by offering an appeasing resolution – reformation
within the government and limiting some of his powers by appointing a prime minister.23
Through this same lens of manipulation, King Mohammad VI was also able to reconstruct the
present norms of how individuals or officials engage in politics by redefining the positions
within his administration and using this as a pretext for further legitimizing the state of Morocco.
Therefore, Sadiki describes King Mohamed VI’s influences in Morocco as a “fulcrum of
power”24. The King was strategic in distancing himself and his policies from those of his
predecessor and father, Hassan II, who has been accused of human rights abuses.25 Religion is
not the definitive answer for why Moroccans did not revolt to the same extent as their neighbors,
but it begins to illuminate how pervasive the manipulation of religion can be in demanding
submission from a ruler’s people – take into account August 21 in Tunisia26. The state
discourages social and religious diversity by reinforcing religious policies such as passing
legislation that mandates the Ramadan fast for Muslims.27 The people of Morocco did not
demand their king step down like their neighbors in Tunisia and Egypt; instead they demanded
Salih, “Roots and Causes”, 184-206.
“Arab uprising: Country by country – Morocco,” BBC News, accessed April 26, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482680.
24 “Arab uprising: Country by country – Morocco.”
25 “Freedom in the World – Morocco,” Freedom House, accessed April 26, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/morocco.
26 Mohammed’s birthday on August 21 is regarded as a public holiday in Morocco.
27 “Freedom in the World – Morocco.”
22
23
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reforms in policies and governmental positions of power. Despite the restrictions, comparatively,
Moroccans enjoyed a freer society than their regional counterparts. In Saudi Arabia, there is also
enforcement of a similar Ramadan policy; however, this policy is indiscriminate, imposed upon
Muslims and non-Muslims.
Much like Morocco, Algeria also resumed with its head of state. The cries for abdication
and regime change were faint at best, as the citizens had been appeased through false promises of
reformations as well as economic stimulants. Algeria is one of the richest countries in North
Africa, and holds more legitimacy than many of its counterparts because of it is perceived as
more “democratic” by comparison.28 Algeria used parliamentary elections to maintain its
legitimacy, while many of its neighbors lacked similar procedures in the period leading up to the
regional unrest. Within North Africa, rulers of oppressive authoritarian regimes enraged their
citizens. Algeria had been an exceptional case because it had become clear that the people were
not rallying for a change in government, rather reparations made to the economy and government
subsidies that would allow locals the ability to acquire subsidized staple goods.29 According to
Louisa Dris-Alt Hamadouche, the government’s announcements of reversals of price increases
and new policies designed to lower the costs of food imports met protesters’ demands and
resulted in the loss of momentum for mass public disobedience and protests. This strategic policy
implementation mirrors the Moroccan government’s eager response in repressing and diluting
dissidence, and in the case of Algeria, it was successful in maintaining the rigged elections that
the government promoted as fair and free.
Historically, Algeria has faced a history of harsh police brutality in response to organized
protests, like during the October 1988 riots in which security forces and the army fired live
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ammunition at the crowds. When the events in Tunisia sparked revolutions that motivated youth
and dissidents across borders, one of the overwhelming fears had been the cries for government
reform and impeachment. Algeria’s circumstances are especially unique under President
Bouteflika, because the government and the people repeated the relationship of obedience and
submission in exchange for improving social and economic needs. Hamadouche writes of the
understood traditional social contract that had been imposed and normalized by the Algerian
regime: “The administration provides better socioeconomic conditions in exchange for
continuing (albeit grudging) political quiescence.”30 It could also be argued that much of
Algeria’s population had not been prepared to have a full-blown revolution because of the fear of
failed socio-political uprisings, like the October riots, or merely having been accustomed to
reforms in response to complaints or in the midst of outrage.
In the midst of the 2011 uprisings, Algeria’s government had been involved in many
forms of censorship, including: media censorship through blocking websites deemed “contrary to
the public order or decency”; outlawing unapproved political parties (approved by the Ministry
of the Interior); using criminal defamation laws to pressure independent newspapers; blocking
radio stations; and explicitly blocking political parties’ website.31 The state was guilty of
restricting religion, as non-Muslims may only gather to worship at state-approved locations as
well as benefitting specific ethnic groups. Algeria is multiethnic consisting of Arabs and Berbers,
yet the majority of elites consisted of Arabs and there was no national recognition of the Berbers’
cultural language which stifled their social and political mobility.32
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Unlike Tunisia’s rural inhabitants, the demographics of those protesting in Egypt were
youth from urban and cosmopolitan areas. While Hosni Mubarak reigned, he was unable to
provide the people with basic services and unable to stimulate the economy, thus leaving tens of
millions of Egyptians to the widespread unemployment and poverty that began to unite citizens.
Egypt’s military has always held enormous influence in the country and the revolutions only
illuminated its presence. Egypt’s government structure and implemented programs were unique
in comparison to its North African counterparts. In fact, in the case of Egypt, one could observe
how integrated Internet had become in society, as a result of information and communication
technology (ICT) being introduced through the government, private sector, and civil society,
which wholesomely formed public private partnership.33 The intended purpose of introducing
ICT into Egyptian society was to bolster socioeconomic development, which could
simultaneously progress living conditions within the nation and afford citizens of all
backgrounds the luxury of access. A utopian and progressive proposal, unfortunately, the
implementation of these programs indicated a clear divide between the youth and older
generations. The introduction of ICT in Egypt illustrates the differences in government programs
and intentions within North Africa, as Egypt sought for a literate, urban and technocratic system
– which was not necessarily the same for the rest of its Arab counterparts. Throughout history,
Egypt has been the hub for the exchange of media and culture entering the Middle East and even
serves as a passage to the Middle East from North Africa, as visible by what has been exploited
for capital, like the Suez Canal. Although the country’s leadership shifted from it’s the dictator
Hosni Mubarak to the Muslim Brotherhood and then a primarily military autocracy, Egypt’s
civilians were still able to remove a monolithic regime in hopes of change. The Freedom House
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reports that the Egyptian government suppressed the freedom of assembly and denied the right to
free and fair trials by banning the Muslim Brotherhood from previous elections that had been
postponed. Academic freedom was limited and media works had been subject to censorship if
deemed contrary to Islam or harmful to the country’s reputation.34
In order to further understand the role of social media within the 2011 uprisings, it is
imperative that its uses and benefits served are clearly defined. In the context of Egypt, scholar
Sherif H. Kamel argues, “Facebook was used mainly to exchange excessive audiovisual
content… Twitter was used for logistical purposes on where to meet, what to avoid and how to
deal with tear gas among other uses…YouTube was instrumental in documenting all sorts of
developments…”35 However, the Arab Spring has linked several countries in the Middle East
and North Africa despite scholars identifying contesting causes for the political uprisings. The
media has often oversimplified these series of events as the “Facebook Revolution” or the
“Twitter Revolution”; yet, failed to prove a significant correlation as to why one should credit
massive political rebellions and mobilized persons to social media. According to Gadi Wolfsfeld,
a cross-cultural comparison that follows the politics-media-politics (PMP) principle36 prioritizes
the political environment to be followed or sparking a presence of social media – which acts as a
facilitator in the midst of rapidly changing political climates, to engage and potentially lead to
further political changes in a political environment. This is a worthwhile argument as it negates
the misconception that these uprisings within the Arab Spring occurred merely as a result of
social media interference, when in fact, all of the countries involved, especially those that
“Freedom in the World – Egypt,” Freedom House, accessed April 26, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/egypt.
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36 This principle states that the role of the media in a political process is best seen as a cycle in which changes
in the political environment lead to changes in media performance, which leads to further political changes in
the political environment.
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resulted in high-conflict areas or removal of leadership, were suffering from economic hardships,
volatility on the basis of inflation, long-standing grievances and rising levels of dissatisfaction
with their respective governments37. Furthermore, the claims to social media’s influence can be
described as crucial to communication or a vehicle of dissemination rather than the determinant
of the events.
There are contesting perspectives on the value social media held during the Arab Spring,
but the insight of those that resist its impact will be referred to as cyber-skeptics and those that
defend its role as cyber-enthusiasts. “The cyber-skeptics downplay the significance of the new
technology, arguing that using the Internet gives people a false sense of participation and keeps
them from actual physical protesting.”38 Although technology alone cannot guarantee revolts and
instantaneous government reforms, a counterargument to the views of the cyber-skeptics can
challenge these claims based on how social media allows communication across myriad forums
and the exchange of beneficial ideas that further organize and mobilize efforts. In fact, “The
cyber-enthusiasts express optimism about the ability of the new media to empower people living
in nondemocratic societies and to allow insurgents to adopt new strategies”39 Thus, scholars like
Lisa Anderson argue that the way in which social media played a role in the midst of political
upheaval was taking advantage of how technology resonated in various local contexts, spanning
from Tunisia to Syria. For instance, the Gulf States that exhibited high levels of social media and
low levels of protests were the inverse of Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, which experienced
lower levels of social media and higher levels of protest.40 However, scholars like Bellin assess
the role of social media in countries like Egypt and Tunisia more reliant on four important
Wolfsfeld, Gadi, Elad Segev, and Tamir Sheafer. 2013. "Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes
First." International Journal Of Press/Politics 18, no. 2: 115-137.
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explanatory factors: long-standing grievances, an emotional trigger, a sense of impunity, and
access to new social media.41
In the case of Tunisia, the final event that sparked the catalyst of full-blown protests and
social dissent amongst the streets was the self-immolation of 26-year old street vendor Mohamed
Bouazizi. Bouazizi was not the first to set himself ablaze, yet the public knows little of
Abdesslem Trimech. Trimech’s immolation did not go viral, nor did it unite mass protestors as
Bouazizi’s did when Al-Jazeera aired his footage on Facebook. This has become one of the
crucial moments that led to collective action, enhanced by social media because if it weren’t for
the publicity that led to longevity, the world may have never heard of Tunisia’s rebellions nor
would the different regions been able to actively unite in protesting former Tunisian president
Ben Ali.42 Wolfsfeld agrees that social media are important because they can provide
information and images that motivate people, they allow groups to organize and mobilize much
more efficiently than in the past, and they allow protestors to convey messages to the outside
world. Figure 1 has been extracted from Byun and Hollander’s Explaining the Intensity of the
Arab Spring:
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Figure 1. Level of Unrest by Country. 43
Figure 1 depicts the varying levels of civil uprisings and the progressions experienced
during the Arab Spring. The countries grouped together under each color experienced similar
levels of social media usage as well as restrictions on civil and personal liberties. In the countries
listed above, especially those that reached levels of militarization without regime removal like
Bahrain and Syria, the role of social media had become especially relevant in broadcasting the
atrocities experienced within a nation’s borders as well as in organizing participation.
The countries in the Persian Gulf had a relatively different experience than those in North
Africa. Many of these countries, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain are wealthier states
and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with governments that were able to
quickly suppress dissidents, some transnationally. The members of the GCC were a part of the
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Peninsula Shield agreement, which aimed to maintain collective security in the region as a
deterrent for international conflict. This treaty is noteworthy as it pertains to how countries in the
region have decided to address events that happen within and outside of their boundaries.
In the case of Oman, the government quickly suppressed protestors and jailed activists
and journalists that supported the attempts to revolt. Certain Gulf nations did not face nearly as
much chaos as other Arab nations whose neighbors had been experiencing increasing violence.
Oman is an absolute monarchy – similar to the authoritarian wield of its neighboring
dictatorships. The Sultan of Oman holds absolute power as no political parties or organized
opposition groups were allowed within the country.44 Thus, there were enforced limitations on
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly (which required official permission), online
censorship, as well as government criticism allowed in Oman that led to self-censorship.45 In
comparison to its neighbors involved in the Arab Spring, Oman exhibited serious levels of
censorship, expected religious compliance and oppression that sparked its citizens’ outrage.
Kuwait experienced a fairly concealed series of protests and had not gained much
attention in the media. When the local media outlet, Al-Jazeera, provided coverage of a brutal
police crackdown on a public demonstration, it was shut down – indicative of the suppression of
media Kuwaitis face.46 The government strengthened its restrictions by banning public rallies in
2010, banning political parties and censoring the internet; however, comparatively it allowed for
a much freer state than its neighbors by allowing multiple independent media outlets, promoting
academic freedom and allowing freedoms of assembly and association that meet governmental
preferences. The Kuwaiti society had been so divisive that even those in favor of the uprisings
“Freedom in the World – Oman,” Freedom House, accessed April 26, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/oman.
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within the country had experienced rifts. This was advantageous for the government because of
the lack of collectivism amongst its dissidents. However, there were countries in the area whose
divisive populations fueled uprisings, like the rebelling Shi’ite minority in Bahrain against the
majority Sunni rule.
The protests of Shi’ites as a minority in Bahrain incited fear in neighboring governments
that minorities within their own national boundaries could also rebel, regardless of their size.
This proved to be the case for Saudi Arabia, whose former leader King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al Saud was inclined to convert the domestic crisis in Bahrain into an issue of regional
instability.47 In this instance, certain leaders in the Persian Gulf worked together to neutralize the
conflicts and halt any further acts of rebellion, while simultaneously suggesting Iran (a majority
Shi’ite nation) was involved in the Bahraini revolution.48 Bahrain’s king harnessed absolute rule
over the government and outlawed political parties – mandating all political associations be
registered with the Ministry of Justice.49 In addition to these restrictions, Bahrain experienced
sectarian strife, censored Internet access, lacked freedom of expression and lacked freedom of
press.50 All news outlets were government owned or had close ties to the government.51
Similar to its neighbor, Saudi Arabia is ruled by Sunni Muslims and has a
disenfranchised Shiite community in addition to being increasingly restrictive of personal and
civil liberties. The government outlawed all political parties, as well as organized political
opposition, resulting in the only forms of dissidence to come from exile. Although Bahrain and
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Saudi Arabia were able to minimize the dissent and increase restrictions, certain rulers were
unable to counteract the people’s calls for reform – like in Yemen.
Yemen’s political climate during the uprisings was especially brutal, and it is worthwhile
to recall it is one of the two countries whose upheavals led to an ongoing civil war.
Unfortunately, Yemen’s circumstances were exacerbated by its long history of conflict between
the regions in the North and South, as well as Yemen’s security forces’ vicious tactics for
aggressively halting protestors.52 When scholar Mohammad Farazmand describes Yemen, he
writes: “A society which has been torn apart due to its tribal composition, separatism in the south
and the Zaida Shia in the north, as well as Ali Abdullah Saleh’s divide and rule policy…”53 His
text illuminates the ongoing insecurities and instabilities in Yemen, which are the result of more
than just different sects of Islam or food insecurity. The people of Yemen endured a 32-year
authoritarian rule by the former President Saleh, and despite refusing the people’s refusal to
resort to violence, there was a collective sense of solidarity and unity that was visible as the
people demanded the abdication of their dictator.
Syria and Yemen, both countries that resulted in ongoing civil wars even after their Arab
counterparts’ uprisings came to a cessation, seemed to have varying results. Syria’s Bashar alAssad, alongside the Alawite minority, has ruled over Syria for generations. This means that a
small population that does not represent the larger percentage of Syrians, has been in an
exclusive position of power over the other ethnic and religious groups, not limited to the Sunni
Muslims, the Kurdish rebel groups and the Salafi rebel groups. Enraged Syrians vastly
outnumbered the repressive regime and its supporters, whether global in Russia, or local; still,
Syria struggled to see the same levels of change that others did in North Africa. Many scholars
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attributed the lack of progression to the type of governance (ruled by the minority), as well as the
level of heterogeneity compared to the more successful ethnically homogenous countries, which
explains the levels of territorial disintegration.54 Thus, Syria has experienced irreversible conflict
that has led to its classification as the world’s leading largest refugee producing country.55
Yemen experienced a similar situation, but it may have already been prone to conflict and
violence because of its longstanding history of conflicts between the North and South.
Nonetheless, both Yemen and Syria are comparable to Libya and the regimes alike because each
ruler was willing to slaughter his people rather than relinquish the throne of power.
Figure 2 compares the restrictions on civil and political rights of the twelve countries
most impacted by the Arab Spring as reported by Freedom House’s Annual Freedom Report.
Country

Status

Freedom Rating

Civil Liberties

Political Rights

Algeria

Not Free

5.5

5

6

Bahrain

Not Free

5.5

5

6

Egypt

Not Free

5.5

5

6

Jordan

Not Free

5.5

5

6

Kuwait

Partly Free

4.5

5

4

Libya

Not Free

7

7

7

Morocco

Partly Free

4.5

4

5

Oman

Not Free

5.5

5

6

Saudi Arabia

Not Free

6.5

6

7

Syria

Not Free

6.5

6

7

Tunisia

Not Free

6

5

7
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Yemen

Not Free

5.5

5

6

Figure 2: The Extent of Suppression leading up to the Arab Spring (1=Best, 7=Worst), 2011.
The people in the Middle East and North Africa wanted basic civil liberties; Figure 2
conveys the lack of freedoms present at the time in which protestors took to the streets. The
youthful generation of these countries’ citizens have rallied for a more democratic government
through peaceful protests, hoping to form alternative political systems, end corruption,
discrimination, and the political and economic prerogatives of the ruling elites – leading to
freedom, equality, justice and welfare.56 Not all of the riots and rebellions subsided, as countries
like Yemen and Syria protracted civil wars; however, the repression of civilians leads to an
inevitable sense of disdain and need for change.
It is vital to observe the methods various governments used to suppress the rights of their
people and the disparities amongst what individual freedoms were allowed in each respective
nation. In most of the wealthier oil states, there were rigid regulations regarding religion, severe
restrictions on freedom of speech, expression and media, heavy online censorship, and a lack of
multiple political parties and assemblies. In North Africa, there were varying levels of freedoms
associated with regimes, for instance, a multiparty system was allowed in Morocco, Algeria,
Libya, and reformed in Egypt, while not at all in Tunisia. In reference to the poorer North
African nations, the youth were more successful in strategically organizing peaceful protests and
capitalizing off the instability and decentralized state. This led to a direct change in government
rule, whereas in the wealthier states (even in North Africa), the governments were able to alter
the policies surrounding the economy and appease protestors by instituting reforms. In the
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countries that were unable to have large-scale protests due to immediate suppression, the
governments tended to have tighter grip on its constituents as well as heightened fear.
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Chapter 2:
This second chapter aims to provide the audience with the origins of Eritrea: from brief
coverage of its historical oppressors to its long journey to independence to the current sociopolitical climate. This context is critical to understanding how the government of Eritrea has
arisen to power from the former Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and become the only
political party allowed within the nation – The People’s Front for Democracy and Justice
(PFDJ). In addition to understanding the political structures within the government, this chapter
will convey the contemporary issue of conscription or national service within Eritrea and how
this civic duty has morphed into being construed as every Eritrean’s duty, a concept reflected in
the Nakfa Principles, which are commonly identified amongst Eritreans as moral and ethical
values inscribed into their identity.
Although mobilizing citizens into the military and other forms of reconstructive service
may seem superfluous, the problem of service is a continuation of the collectivist mindset and
community based approach to life that is widespread in Eritrea and stems from a time in history
when individual sacrifice was needed to reach independence. Over 25 years later and the
government has framed the nation’s security as being at risk from its enemy and former
oppressor, Ethiopia, as well as Western powers that support its neighbor. Furthermore, this
section intends to contrast conscription in the North African and Middle Eastern countries that
were deeply affected by the Arab Uprisings. In addition, this section will include significant
cultural similarities shared between Eritrea and its Arab neighbors. Overall, the chapter will
compare Eritrea and its relevance to the North African countries that experienced social and
political upheaval during 2011 and how Eritrea’s socio-political relations were in route to a
similar outcome of its regional counterparts, had mobilization and individualism been the
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priorities. In a continuation of the previous chapter, this argument lays the groundwork to
connect the relevance of the Arab Spring to Eritrea and why Eritrea has been stagnant in political
dissidence within the country.
Eritrea: From Colonialism to Liberation to the Contemporary Context
The nation of Eritrea has had a long history of oppression in regards to the
disenfranchisement of Eritrean peoples by the Ottoman, Egyptian, British, Italian, and Ethiopian
forces.57 Eritrea was recognized as a federation of Italy in the 19th century, and then was seized
under British rule from 1941 until 1952, when it was annexed as a federation of Ethiopia. Eritrea
endured a thirty years armed struggle from 1961 to 1991, while simultaneously experiencing
political upheaval between two competing guerilla armies: Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). With varying ideologies, the first Eritrean guerilla
army, ELF, attempted to suppress the arising dissident group, EPLF, from as early as 1972, until
the two groups came to a truce in 1974.58 It was not until 1981 that the ELF was extinguished
and exiled from Eritrea by the EPLF.59 The leadership of the ELF was formed amongst Muslim
scholars and intellectuals, mainly receiving support from Arab and Muslim states like Egypt and
Sudan.60 This movement later reached Eritrean Christians – also encompassing a multitude of
tribes and clans within a pluralistic society. The tension led to the formation of the EPLF, which
was spearheaded by Isaias Afewerki.
Isaias Afewerki, known to many as the freedom fighter that led the Eritrean people to
victory, has held office in Eritrea as president since it reached independence. Officially, in April
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1993, the international community formally recognized Eritrea as sovereign after fulfilling the
UN-supervised referendum. It has been nearly 26 years that Eritrean citizens have recognized
themselves as a part of an independent nation, and technically 24 by the international
community; all throughout, Isaias Afewerki has reigned. There has not been a single national
election since the UN-supervised referendum, nor has the constitution been implemented, with
an indefinite postponement.61 The only ruling political party allowed in Eritrea is the successor
of the EPLF, known as the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). It is illegal for any
competing nationalist party to exist in Eritrea, and the government refuses to permit the return of
any of its rival factions.62 As the majority of Eritreans now live outside of the country, PFDJ has
extended its membership to include diaspora living abroad in hopes of exercising an annual 2%
tax to support the government. These recurring 2% taxes are masked as the government’s
attempt at reconstruction post independence. The organization connected to the expansive
diaspora network of government supporters is the Young People’s Front for Democracy and
Justice (YPFDJ). With access to political power within Eritrea and abroad amongst its
supporters, Isaias Afewerki and PFDJ have constructed an “iron curtain” around the country to
protect it from its neighbors and the disapproving members of the international community. To
further solidify the link between nationalism within Eritrea and transnationalism from the
expatriates and diaspora communities across the globe, the Ministers and PFDJ officials attend
the diaspora’s festivals and nation-wide community meetings outside of Eritrea.63 These events
include: the Annual North American YPFDJ Conference, Martyrs’ Day, Annual Eritrean Festival
in D.C., and events alike that connect the younger and older generations of Eritrea abroad with
the agendas of PFDJ. The government is selective with receiving foreign aid, promoting that
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Eritrea will become self-reliant and exude resilience by avoiding the corruption that often lingers
with foreign aid. There were 38 international aid agencies in the 1990s but only four by 2009.64
The 30-year long independence struggle bred not only freedom, but also overwhelming levels of
nationalism that have left millions of supporters blind to the corruption inflicted by the despotic
regime.
So what is distinct about Eritrea? Why has the country not followed in its neighbors’
footsteps? Contrary to the political climate of the North African countries during the Arab
Spring, Eritrea’s citizens have been unable to mobilize an effort to rebel. In fact, the only case of
mobilization within Eritrea has stemmed from the government. African Studies PhD. Researcher
David M. Bozzini writes:
People whom I call conscripts are male and female individuals carrying
out national duty as required by law: they are temporarily mobilised for
military and civil purposes by the state... However, since 1998 and the two
years war against Ethiopia, National Service has been indefinitely
extended and no demobilisation program has taken place” 65 (93).
The “conscripts” of Eritrea are born into a systematic oppression resembling modern day
slavery. They are forced to serve their nation regardless of their political views and expected to
remain obedient while earning less than necessary wage to survive and support their families
back home. Bozzini articulates the conditions of service and the only instance where
mobilization takes place in Eritrea. This obligation is resented by the youthful generation in
Eritrea, much more than the older generations, which fought for the nation’s independence.
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There is a sizable gap separating what the older and younger generation view as civic
duties, which explains the rise in those attempting to leave Eritrea. According to scholar Sara
Dorman, “Since the summer of 2001, Eritrean youth have been at the centre of political crises.
The rejection, by some youth, of societal and state expectations that they will ‘serve the nation’
challenges the post-liberation political institutions”.66 The notion of service is glorified in Eritrea
by older generations. The reverence is apparent in holidays of remembrance, like Martyrs’ Day,
as scholar Bereketeab writes, “No one died; they simply became a martyr.”67 Despite the culture
of youthful sacrifice, this was an overwhelming trait pertinent to a different era, one that was
prior to independence. Scholar Tesfai writes, “Martyrdom was an inevitable outcome of
liberation.”68 The issue with this reflection in application to the contemporary context is that
liberation has already been attained; yet the youth is placed under a cultural expectation to risk
their lives when their freedom should have already been secured. National service spans from
military service to civil service and public sector projects that contribute to the ongoing national
reconstruction.69 In addition to adult citizens fleeing Eritrea after being conscripted, there are
children who have not even reached secondary school and are evading the draft, many of which
have not even reached the age of 14.70 Regardless of age, this program contributes directly to the
mass migration of Eritrean refugees to all parts of the world. “In 2015, the largest number of
applications for asylum in the UK came from nationals of Eritrea (3,729)”71 The number of
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Eritreans that flee to Ethiopia and Sudan is colossal in comparison to those that make it to
developed nations like Italy, United Kingdom, Germany and the rest of the Global North. In
2008, at least 43,000 fled Eritrea to Sudan or Ethiopia. Eritrea is ranked as the second-biggest
source of asylum seekers by the UN, despite having ranked 113th in population size.72 It is
estimated that at least a quarter of a million refugees live in neighboring Sudan and Ethiopia
within refugee camps.73
What the world views as the refugee exodus is the aftermath of those who are able to
escape past the “shoot-to-kill”74 borders. The CIA writes, “His government has created a highly
militarized society by pursuing an unpopular program of mandatory conscription into national
service, sometimes of indefinite length”. According to the UN Commission of Inquiry, some of
the terrible conditions during the indefinite duration of national service include “arbitrary
detention, torture, sexual torture, forced labour, absence of leave and the ludicrous pay…make
national service an institution where slavery-like practices are routine.”75 Not all who participate
in national service experience these conditions; however, an overwhelming number of conscripts
have been forced to flee because of these horrendous circumstances.
Eritrea’s regional counterparts in North Africa: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Sudan
and Morocco all have levels of conscription associated with each nation. Despite the similar
laws, the difference between Eritrea and many of the other countries is the strict enforcement
alongside the poor standard of living and quality of life. In many Arab-speaking countries, such

Jopson, “Inside the Insular and Secretive Eritrea.”
Brhane, Mogos O. 2016. "Understanding why Eritreans go to Europe." Destination: Europe, 34-35.
74 “Eritrea: 20 Years of independence, but still no freedom,” Amnesty International, 36. Accessed April 26,
2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr640012013.pdf
75 "Report of the Commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea." United Nation. Accessed April 26, 2017,
13. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A-HRC-29-42_en.pdf.
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as Egypt or Syria, conscription targets males between 18-30 that have another male sibling.76
Conversely, Eritrea does not discriminate entry based on gender. In fact, Eritreans between the
ages of 18-40 are required to serve in the national service as a direct result of the WarsayYikealo Development Campaign in 2002.77 In order to grasp context as to why this campaign
was passed, it is essential to understand the prior 1998-2000 border dispute between Eritrea and
Ethiopia over the major war zone of Badme. When describing the situation of Badme, scholar
Jon Abbink describes it as, “One of the most intense and bloody wars that Africa has seen in
recent years, with an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 deaths.” The highly politicized border dispute
over Badme occurred within a decade of independence, which made both wars relevant in the
politics of Eritrean daily life. In December 2000, a peace accord known as the Algiers
Agreement ruled that Badme was a part of Eritrea.78 Despite this internationally recognized
arbitrational ruling, Ethiopia has not accepted the terms and ruling of the decision. The state of
Eritrea has used this war as a need for the Warsay-Yikealo Development Campaign as well as
ongoing mobilization of citizens. By framing its neighbor as an existential threat, Eritrea
becomes the referent object and its military is able to move towards securitization of the people
by means of mandatory civic service.79 Alongside the post-structurialist framework of security
studies, scholar David Campbell argues, “The constitution of identity is achieved through the
inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an
“other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign.”80 In the case of Eritrea, the government has constructed
Eritreans as the “inside” and Ethiopia as the “outside” threat. The Eritrean people are able to
“The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed April 26, 2017,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html.
77 Dorman, "Narratives of nationalism in Eritrea,” 203-222.
78 “Reports of international arbitral awards,” United Nations, accessed April 26, 2017,
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/216-224.pdf.
79 Campbell, David. 1998. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. n.p.:
Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.
80 Campbell, Writing Security.
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retain and solidify this “inside” identity by subscribing to a set of principles or values that unite
them within their culture: The Nakfa Principles. In the “Eritrean National Identity: A Case
Study”, Ann Peggy Hoyle describes component values of Eritrean national identity in terms of
ethical behavior, belief in critical public speech, perseverance or steadfastness, an emphasis on
the community over the individual, and a commitment to self-reliance.81 The Nakfa Principles
are in Tigrinya, which does not always translate smoothly into English, but Hoyle’s description
encapsulates the general themes. In Tigrinya they are written as: Ma’arinet (Equality), Harinet
(Individual Freedom), Natsinet (Independence or Liberation from the Colonizer), Tsinat
(Resilience/Perseverance), Tewefainet (Sacrifice/Martyrdom) and Bitsaynet (Camaraderie).82
These values are the closest way to describe the Nakfa Principles that have become engrained in
the daily lives of Eritrean citizens; they are used as socio-cultural leverage to maintain the status
quo and decisions made by the government. The aforementioned emphasis on the community
over the individual is the reason that systems in place, like conscription, are able to exist. In
theory, national service aiming to further reconstruction could bolster living conditions;
however, in the case of Eritrea, the scarce nominal wage and excessive constraints on conscripts
delegitimize the initial aims of the program while impeding citizens’ abilities to sustain a livable
wage.
In 2011 as the first signs of rebellion occurred in Tunisia, Eritrea was experiencing
ongoing repression in the form of requiring blind nationalism under the guise of civic duty.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “The state has justified the mass
mobilization with the need for national development and to foster a common sense of national

Hoyle, Ann Peggy. 1999. "Eritrean National Identity: A Case Study." North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation 24, no. 2: 401-05.
82 Interview with author, April 25, 2017.
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identity.”83 The reason the youth are inherently incapable of organizing is the systematic
oppression that is Sawa84 alongside the vehement control the government has in the lives of its
citizens. The students in Eritrea are able to attend primary and secondary school until eleventh
grade, then they must leave their homes and complete their final year at Sawa. Students are not
able to travel freely from Sawa to their homes within this year and must receive specified
permission from their respective authorities, unless it is a major national holiday. After the
completion year at Sawa, there is a standardized national exam administered and pending
results85, students are to be placed in a university or vocational assignment. Unfortunately, many
education sites have closed, so students are frequently placed wherever there is a shortage of
labor, regardless of their ambitions.86 Despite the process of higher education placement,
students are forced into a cloaked civic duty that typically extends far past the 18-month promise.
Some are never able to reach higher education as their service is extended. According to the
CFR, “In addition, the Government has subjected much of the population to open-ended national
service, either in the army or through the civil service, often for years in harsh and inhumane
conditions.”87

Zachary Laub, 2015. "Authoritarianism in Eritrea and the Migrant Crisis." Accessed April 26, 2017,
http://www.cfr.org/eritrea/authoritarianism-eritrea-migrant-crisis/p37239.
84 Sawa is a military training camp designed to ensure Eritrean youths are prepared to serve in national
service.
85 The Eritreans who do not score above a certain caliber (score of 1.8) are sent to places like Mamose to
learn trades such as plumbing, carpentry, etc. Only those who score above 1.8 are able to pursue higher
education for professions like business, education, marketing, etc.
86 Interview with author, April 25, 2017.
87 “Thousands of civilians fleeing ‘rule of fear’ in Eritrea, say UN experts, warning of gross rights abuses,” UN
News Centre, Accessed April 26, 2017,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.WC0d7KIrKqA
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Figure 3: Close up image of Sawa military camp, 2015.
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Figure 4: Camp Accommodation and School, Detention Facilities, 2015.
Figure 3 and 4 depict the various secured facilities that students and prisoners occupy, all
within a remote location. The dotted blue and dotted red rectangular lines in the bottom half of
the image show the “Warsai Yikealo Secondary School”. Within these red lines is where Eritrean
students who are studying for their final year of secondary school reside, while the dashed blue
lines represent the “Accommodation of Conscripts”, where the Eritreans who are to serve for
national civic duty are stationed. The close proximity of the two buildings is ironic because the
former is for many students a direct pathway to the latter. Neither of the accommodations,
prisons or schools, are in exceptional conditions because of the arid weather combined with the
location and resources. After a student is given a placement, he or she is expected to remain
within that field regardless of preference. The government chooses its citizens’ occupation and
there is no further deliberation unless a need for an alternate service arises. In this case, a worker
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would be permitted to change occupations, but this does not result in further education. Instead,
one would be sent to the area requiring service and the worker would be trained on site.88
In Figure 4, the nearby prisons depicted with green dotted lines, yellow dotted lines, and
large red circles are where those who attempt to defect from Sawa end up, as well as those who
express political dissent. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, “The Eritrean government uses
a vast apparatus of official and secret detention facilities to incarcerate thousands of Eritreans
without charge or trial.”89 Many of these detention facilities in Eritrea, like the one depicted in
the figures above, had not previously been revealed to the rest of the world until these images
were made available in 2015. In fact, HRW revealed, “Many of the prisoners are detained for
their political or religious beliefs, other because they tried to evade the indefinite national service
or flee the country.”90 These conditions described by the human rights crusader may stem from
concerns that began after the imprisonment of the ‘G-15’, the group of 15 former top government
officials and former liberation leaders that were jailed after writing an open letter in 2001 calling
for a ‘peaceful and democratic dialogue’. The following chapter will further unpack the methods
and levels of suppression within the Eritrea, covering the ‘G-15’ in depth. National security
continues to serve as the guise in which the government is able to reign without repercussion;
however, Eritrea has gained traction in the global community for the claims of injustices within
the country.
Why is Eritrea Comparable to North Africa and the Middle East?
Aside from having an authoritarian regime that has postponed elections indefinitely,
Eritrea has many political, economic, and social characteristics that mirror those of the Arab

Interview with author, April 25, 2017.
"Eritrea: Repression Creating Human Rights Crisis." 2015. Human Rights Watch. Accessed April 12, 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/16/eritrea-repression-creating-human-rights-crisis.
90 “”Eritrea: Repression Creating Human Rights Crisis.”
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world. Although the majority of Eritreans speak Tigrinya, the nation’s second official language
is Arabic, followed by English. Islam is a prominent religion practiced in Eritrea; therefore,
Arabic is the cultural language of many Eritreans. This separates many different types of
Eritreans that are unable to have social mobility within commerce or government because their
mother tongues, whether they are Bilen, or Kunama, as some tribes are not represented in
government positions or popular businesses. Within the nine tribes of Eritrea, the Nilotic people
consist of the Kunama and Nara tribes. The Cushitic people consist of Afar, Saho, Bilen,
Hedarab tribes. The Semitic people are the Tigrinya, Tigre and Rashaida.91 Within these tribes,
the Tigrinya tribe is the largest in Eritrea, followed by the Tigre, which correlates to how these
tribes hold the largest recognition of social status, business owners and government office. These
same Semitic people are recognized as Afro-Asiatic and having Arab roots dating back to the
invasions by the Ottoman Empire and crossing over the Red Sea from the Middle East.92 Despite
the nine tribes which each have a respective language, the official language systems recognized
within Eritrea have been simplified to a binary construct – elevating the Christian-Tigrinya and
the Islamic-Arabic. By administering two official languages that belong to distinct groups within
Eritrea, the government has been able to separate socio-cultural groups, creating or further
perpetuating a system of elites more inclined to positions of power and preserving distinct
customs within the nation; these practices are similar to the treatment of Berbers in North Africa
and various minority ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East. Just as the countries in
Middle East are predominantly Muslim, with some answering to Sharia courts, Eritrea has a
significant Muslim population that separates its judicial practices to respect the religious abiding
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to Islam. In fact, within Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, Connell and Killion note that Eritrea
was one of the earliest non-Arabian sites for contact with Islam. Approximately half of the
population in Eritrea is Muslim, mainly residing in the lowlands while Christians are mostly in
the highlands.
There was a constitution approved in 1997 that still has not been enforced. This allows
the chief of state, Isaias Afewerki, to monopolize levels of authority within the regime,
subsequently allowing himself a life-long term. The individual rights have been disregarded for
the rights of the collective.93 Scholars recognize safeguarding the nation shapes the climate
within Eritrea, often disregarding the personal liberties that are celebrated in the West. Citizens
within Eritrea are able to view others outside of the country enjoying the luxuries of living in a
less restricted nation, which motivates the youth to flee the country in hopes of a better life. The
CIA reports that Eritrea’s population was of 5,869,869 in 2016. Researcher Michael Aliprandini
reported that Eritrea had a population of 6,527,689 in 2015. Previously, there had been a reported
population 2.25% population growth;94 however, sources like the UNHCR report that 5,000
refugees leave Eritrea each month.95 The U.N. estimates that 400,000 Eritreans—9% of the
population—have fled in recent years, not counting those who died or were stranded en route.”96
This discrepancy indicates the lack of accountability within the records of Eritrea and the lack of
focus that researchers give to the country. Like many Arab states, the value placed on Eritrea
correlates with the natural resources that can be extracted. In 2015, Eritrea was ranked 186th of
188 on the United Nations Human Development Index, which is indicative of the lack of decent

Bereketeab, Redie. 2016. Eritrea’s refugee crisis and the role of the international community. Nordiska
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94 Aliprandini, Michael. 2016. "Eritrea." 1. MAS Ultra - School Edition.
95 Bereketeab, “Eritrea’s refugee crisis.”
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poverty." The Wall Street Journal. February 02, 2016.
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standard of living in addition to the lack of basic human needs. The Human Development Index
conducted by the United Nations Development Program listed Eritrea at 179h place as of 2016.97
The Youth unemployment rate for those ages 15-24 is 13%, which is a rise from 2011.98
According to the Eritrea Country Review, at least 50% of the population is living below the
poverty line. As majority of the population participates in subsistence agriculture, families
typically are getting by making what they are able to use themselves, instead of having a
profitable surplus in which they are able to engage in market trades with. An estimated 80% of
the population participates in agricultural subsistence, despite the recurring droughts and
overgrazing of lands within the country year round. As economic conditions remain stagnant, it
is no surprise the nation placed 162 out of 178 on the “Life Satisfaction Index” with a score of
146.67, which assesses the notion of subjective happiness with qualitative parameters such as
health, wealth, and access to basic education.99
In accordance with these facts, observers notice the driving factors of the refugee exodus
include the ongoing results of “no war no peace”100 situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Within this, Bereketeab reports the factors of: constant threat of war, indefinite national service,
harsh political environment, economic hardship, unemployment, blanket asylum provision by
host communities, sanctions, and unfortunately, the hopelessness youth looking for alternative
future.101 These driving factors parallel the significant driving factors that led countries within
North Africa to start the Arab uprisings in 2011. The data shown in Figure 5 are meant to
compare and convey conscription details of countries affected by the Arab Spring in North
“Eritrea,” United Nations Development Programme, Accessed April 26, 2017,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ERI.
98“Youth Unemployment rate,” United Nations Development Programme, Accessed April 26, 2017,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/110906
99 “ Eritrea: 2017 Country Review,” Country Watch, Accessed April 26, 2017,
http://www.countrywatch.com/Content/pdfs/reviews/B38MQ88L.01c.pdf
100 “Eritrea: 2017 Country Review”
101 “Eritrea: 2017 Country Review”
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Africa and the Middle East; all the statistics were all obtained from the CIA’s World
Factbook.102
Country

Conscription Exist?

Age Range?

Length of Service?

Algeria

Yes, Mandatory

17= min for voluntary

18 months service= 6

military service, 19-

months basic training,

30= legal min in case

12 months civil

of general/partial

projects

compulsory
mobilization
Bahrain

No, Voluntary

18= min for voluntary

No mandatory

military service, 15=

conscription

for NCOs, technician
and cadets
Egypt

Yes, Mandatory

16= min for voluntary

18-36 month followed

military service, 18-

by 9 year reserve

30= male conscript

obligation

military service
Jordan

No, Voluntary

17= voluntary male

Initial service=2

military service

years, option to
reenlist for 18 years,
women not subject to
conscription but can
volunteer to serve in
noncombat military
positions in the Royal
Jordanian Arab Army
Women’s Corps and
RJAF, Conscription
was suspended

Kuwait

102

No, Voluntary

17-21= voluntary

Conscription was

military service

suspended

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html
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Libya
Morocco

Yes
No, Voluntary

18=min for mandatory

No indicated

or voluntary service

timeframe

20= min for voluntary

No conscription,

military service

service obligation= 18
months

Oman

No, Voluntary

18-30= voluntary

No conscription

military service
Saudi Arabia

No, Voluntary

17=min for voluntary

No conscription

military service
Sudan

Yes

18-33= male and

1-2 year service

female compulsory or

obligation, previously

voluntary military

required before

service

entering public/private
sector employment
has been cancelled

Syria

Yes

18=compulsory and

Conscript service

voluntary military

obligation=18 months,

service

women not
conscripted but may
volunteer to serve, reenlistment obligation
5 years, w/ retirement
after 15 years or age
40, or 20 years or age
45

Tunisia

Yes

20-23= compulsory

1 year service

service, 18-23=

obligation

voluntary service
Yemen

No, Voluntary

18=legal min for

No conscription, 2

voluntary military

year obligation

Figure 5: Conscription during the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa.
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There is a consistent trait of all of the countries in North Africa listed in Figure 5: they all
have military conscription. This is parallel to Eritrea’s conscription policy, although certain
nations make exceptions for service based on gender. All of the Middle Eastern countries listed
in Figure 5, with the exception of Syria, have ceased any form of mandatory conscription and
allow the option of voluntary military service. The relevance of these statistics aims to highlight
the oppressive nature of service that Eritrea shares with its regional neighbors that are considered
Arab and were deeply affected by the Arab Spring, with the exception of Sudan – who had just
ended a civil war at the time with what is now South Sudan. The data that links Eritrea to the rest
of North Africa reveals the similar situations of unemployment, lack of resources, food
shortages, lack of government subsidies and overall lack of good governance. Much like its
neighboring countries, Eritrea’s government has failed in providing its poorer communities with
necessary resources to thrive, while maintaining restrictive policies on its people.
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Chapter 3:
What is the significance of observing the Arab Spring and the environments of countries
that were able to overthrow their political leaders versus those countries that were heavily
suppressed? Does this signify the ability citizens have to mobilize within a respective context (or
even what has been referred to as a “contagion effect”103)? How does the reaction to the “G-15”
and tense treatment depict the repercussions of practicing forms of human expression and
feelings of contempt within Eritrea? This chapter aims to connect the previous chapter’s
coverage of Eritrea’s conscription with the essence of Eritrea’s state of surveillance. It is
imperative that these comparisons are made in full, which means one can not neglect identifying
the mediums of suppression used within the context of Eritrea to ultimately prevent dissent and
simultaneously breed fear. The enigmatic nature of the regime’s political restrictions, which seep
into socio-cultural interactions, is critical to identify when discussing how Eritrea has lagged in
comparison to its regional counterparts with political upheaval in response to restricted liberties.
Thus, this chapter will ultimately explore the possibilities of what Eritrea would have needed to
successfully achieve variant levels of success as the twelve countries most affected by the Arab
Uprisings, as well as if the preceding factors of dissent are applicable after investigating social
and political institutions present in Eritrea.
Before reaching the conclusion of what Eritrea would have needed to reach widespread
levels of dissidence within the country, this chapter will first research the government’s
restrictions on civil and personal liberties. In addition to the exploration of political procedures
and norms set in place, this chapter will delve into the topic of collective nationalism stressed
Scholar Ioana Matesan describes the contagion effect as a mechanism of revolutionary cascade that
signaled nonviolent tactics have wide public appeal across the region. She references Eva Bellin, who suggests
that the logic of deliberate diffusion, which refers to the conscious sharing of tactics by activist; and the logic
of the demonstration effect, which suggests that successful precedents can set off waves of optimism and
euphoria that become more powerful than rational considerations about risks and benefits.
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over individual identity or ethnicity, economic restraints, homogeneity within the media and
culture in Eritrea – allowing one to further understand the demographic build up that remains
after those in danger have fled Eritrea and how the Eritrean diaspora relates to the apparatus of
citizens.
The Suppression of Media in Eritrea:
In recent years, Eritrea has received immense negative publicity from the international
community, but there was a catalyst that led to the current stigmas associated with the country in
the Horn of Africa. Currently, there are only two news outlets allowed in Eritrea and they are
both state-sponsored, meaning the government controls and approves the media that is
distributed within the country and abroad to those in the diaspora that maintain their Eritrean
identity transnationally. These aforementioned news media are known as EriTV and EriTV2 –
the former is broadcasted globally via satellite and the latter is for the locals within the country;
they disseminate information from Eritrea’s Ministry of Information.104 According to the
Eritrean Embassy’s website, “Eritrea’s main objectives in this field are to: develop free,
responsible and credible mass media: to promote the democratization process and strengthen
national unity: to provide the public with news and timely information…to enhance public
debate and discussion.”105 Despite the current state of press in Eritrea, obligatory state-controlled
media was not always the case. In fact, there had previously been eight news outlets that
operated independently.
In 2001, the government cracked down on private media and news outlets within the
country, in response to the open letter calling for a ‘peaceful and democratic dialogue’ by a
group of fifteen former top government officials and liberation leaders (The G-15): Mahmud
“Media and Communication,” Embassy of the State of Eritrea, Accessed on April 26, 2017, http://eritreanembassy.se/press-release/media.
105 “Media and Communication.”
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Ahmed Sheriffo (PFDJ and National Council), Haile Woldensae (PFDJ, National Council, and
Ministerial Cabinet), Mesfin Hagos (PFDJ Executive Committee, National Council), Ogbe
Abrha (former General, PFDJ and National Council), Hamid Hmd (PFDJ and National Council
Member), Saleh Kekya (PFDJ and National Council), Estifanos Seyoum (Former General, PFDJ
and National Council), Berhane Ghebreghzabiher (PFDJ and National Council), Astier
Feshatsion (PFDJ and National Council), Mohammed Berhan Blata (PFDJ and National
Council), Petros Solomon (PDFJ, National Council and Ministerial Cabinet), Germano Nati
(PFDJ and National Council), Adhanom Ghebremariam (PFDJ and National Council), and Haile
Menkerios (PFDJ and National Council).106 To gain deeper understanding of the backlash these
politicians faced, it is crucial to examine the collective legislation they presented to the rest of
their political governing body, the PFDJ. In the Open Letter to All PFDJ Members, the G-15
expressed, “This letter is a call for correction, a call for peaceful and democratic dialogue, a call
for strengthening and consolidation, a call for unity, a call for the rule of law and for justice,
through peaceful and legal ways and means.”107 The letter that led to the imprisonment of the
former politicians and Tegaldelti108 began as a nonviolent petition for the acknowledgement of a
common goal established prior to the international legitimization of the Eritrea, yet it was
immediately rendered a threat to national security as an attempt to overthrow the president. 2001
marked eight years of unrestrained leadership by a ruler instead of a progression towards a
constitutional government and democracy – the same factors that oppressed Eritreans in the form
of Egyptians, Ottomans, Italians, British, Ethiopians and arguably the ELF – which believed

“Open letter to all PFDJ Members,” Accessed on April 26, 2017,
http://www.snitna.com/docs/Open_Letter_to_All_PFDJ_Members_by_G_15_english.pdf
107 “Open letter to all PFDJ Members.”
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independence.
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Eritrea was not ready for a multi-party presence. The G-15 outlined their request contingent on
the wills of the people who professed united aims when freeing the nation. They wrote, “In the
Eritrean reality, guaranteeing and consolidating internal democracy within the PFDJ is essential
to ensure a democratic process of transition and the establishment of a democratic constitutional
government; and our aim and message is this, and only this.”109 The motive behind this letter was
a direct response to the limitedness of the regime; unfortunately, it defied the status quo of
following the highest forms of authority within the country, obediently. Nevertheless, this was a
clear attempt at reformation and justice starting with an internal assembly that answered directly
to the head of the state. The rest of the letter went on to describe the experience of the EPLF, its
preliminary stage, its plight until liberation, post-referendum, and concluded with methods to
resolve the particular crisis the country had been facing.
In many democratic nations, there is an understood social contract110 that allows citizens
to hold their respective governments accountable for areas of improvement, which is often
addressed through electoral procedures. The twelve Arab nations observed throughout these
arguments had unifying experiences regarding rigged and unfair elections, as well as restrictions
placed on the right to assemble. What is to be done in the case of a nation that has indefinitely
postponed elections? Can there be an accountability system in place when those who hold office
are not required to respond to the pleas of their people, including the legislative members? Who
is liable to the citizens or is there a lack of responsibility that has been enclosed in governmental
positions of power? All members of the G-15 were part of the PFDJ and the National Council,

“Open letter to all PFDJ Members.”
Celeste Friend, “Social Contract Theory,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed April 26, 2017,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/.
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yet any opposing opinions were deemed intolerable and treasonous. The G-15 is a precedent for
any aspiring journalist in Eritrea but that is not the extent of their representation.
The danger of being jailed for writing, reading or speaking ill of the president is what has
been instilled through these acts and dispersed amongst the Eritrean people living within the
country, a luxury that the diaspora is not in an immediate danger of. There is a powerful motive
of remaining submissive when you are helplessly encountering fear in every social space.111 The
accredited scholarship post-2001 that exists about Eritrea’s political climate and any sense of
dissent is published outside of the country. Eritrea’s Ministry of Information releases the
propaganda-like information published within the borders of Eritrea, and private sources of
media or press are not allowed within Eritrea.112 This has sparked the demand for letters like the
Open Letter to All PFDJ Members, international attention of human rights organizations and free
press institutions, as well as Eritreans who have fled the country in an attempt to stay safe, i.e.:
the refugee exodus.
In the case of the G-15, nine of the senior government officials have been confirmed as
dead.113 Baraki Gebreselassi, Germano Nati, Hamid Hmd, Estifanos Seyoum, Saleh Keyka,
Astier Feshatsion, Mahmud Ahmed Sheriffo, and Obge Abrha all died within captivity as a result
of harsh conditions and the lack of thorough medical attention, except Berhane Gebregzabhier,
who was executed. In addition to the deaths of the senior government officials, there were also
arrested journalists who died in captivity. All of the political prisoners were initially held in
Embat’kala prison and the rest in Era’ero prison. According to interviews conducted by Human
Rights Concern Eritrea, “At first, it wasn’t a prison facility at all. It was a school and a training
Bozzini, David. 2015. "The Fines and the Spies: Fears of State Surveillance in Eritrea and in the Diaspora."
Social Analysis 59, no. 4: 32-49.
112 “Media and Communication.”
113 “All but two of the 11 former senior government officials of Eritrea confirmed dead.” 2009. Assenna.
Accessed April 26, 2017, http://www.ehrea.org/gd.pdf
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centre for various kinds of skills.”114 Because of the initial purpose of the facility, the conditions
for prisoners were much more tolerable. However, the descriptions of Era’ero prison encapsulate
the severity in response to those who challenge the regime. In an interview with a former prison
guard, Human Rights Concern Eritrea discovered, “Era’ero is different from Embat’kala.
Embat’kala was not designed for prisoners and the prisoners could at least go out twice a day. In
Era’ero however, they are kept in their cells for 24 hours. They don’t even know whether it is
day or night…the climactic conditions at Era’ero were too harsh for the prisoners and prison
guards.”115 When a former member of Eritrea’s security division can attest to the severity of the
conditions, which both the guards and prisoners faced, it is indicative of the rights or the lack of
rights of citizens within the nation. The means to solve the problem that is the oppression and
regression of independent rights and denial to access of uncensored or free media is unified
opposition. The former prison guard remarked, “the suffering is getting worse but the people
have to show their opposition otherwise there is no resolution. They are showing their
opposition. The fact that half of the population has left the country is the evidence.”116 If the
testimonies above fail to prove the suppressive climate of media and personal liberties in Eritrea,
then one could also turn to the international surveillance that has arisen in the aftermath of
President Afewerki’s decision to ban investigative journalists and outside civil society.
According to reports made by Amnesty International, the detained prisoners of
consciousness have been detained in Eritrea’s conspicuous confinements without any official
charges or scheduled trials.117 The imprisonment of the ten journalists who assisted in publishing
“Eritrea: Ten Years of Torture – An Eritrean ex-prison guard remembers,” 2011. Human Rights Concern
Eritrea, accessed April 26, 2017, http://hrc-eritrea.org/391/.
115 “Eritrea: Ten Years of Torture.”
116 “Eritrea: Ten Years of Torture.”
117 “Eritrea: Immediately and unconditionally release prisoners of conscience,” 2016. Amnesty International,
accessed April 26, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eritrea-immediately-andunconditionally-release-prisoners-of-conscience/
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the politicians’ open letter in 2001 has increased to 21 journalists by 2016.118 As of 2016, four of
the journalists have been reported as dying in detention.119 The gravity of these arrests and
subsequent deaths are symbolic of the gross suppression of private and free media in Eritrea.
When any group of citizens share a political opinion contrary to that of the head of the state, they
may be charged with treason or detained without any charges.120 This leads to an overwhelming
fear amongst those living within the country that are unable to voice political opinions in public,
unlike the diaspora who do not face immediate reprimanding or repercussions.
The government’s stronghold is virtually impenetrable through its grip over personal
liberties that span past liberties. According to Amanda Poole, “The Eritrean state has maintained
tight control over civil society and the actions of foreign-aid and development organizations.”121
There is a slue of scholarship detailing the methods of instilling fear that is associated with
Eritrea’s authoritarian regime. This is oddly reminiscent of the fear held by Eritreans during the
1961-1991guerilla warfare, when Eritrean spies lived amongst the population and reported any
members of dissidence to the Ethiopian regime. Two Eritrean refugees in Switzerland described
the levels of fear when discussing politics within Eritrea. They reported, “You cannot speak
about politics in Eritrea, even within your own family circle.”122 This is a commonly shared
consensus of the self-censorship that Eritreans experience daily inside the country. It is on these
contingencies that Eritrea has been consistently characterized as a prison state by the media.123
Suppression in the Form of Religion:
118
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According to the Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the
expansion of freedom and democracy around the world, the state of Eritrea is ranked as a 7 on a
scale of 1-7 (1=best, 7=worst) in civil liberties, political rights and overall freedom.124 This level
of freedom can best be represented in the limitedness of religiosity. The Freedom House has
reported that there have only been four faiths recognized by the State of Eritrea since 2002:
Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Lutheranism as practiced by the
Evangelical Church of Eritrea. In case the tyrannical repression of religion is unclear or
ambiguous, one should observe the remainder of religions that have been outlawed in Eritrea and
the repercussions the devout worshippers face for expressing their religious affiliation.
According to the Freedom House, “Members of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches face
persecution, but the most severe treatment is reserved for Jehovah’s Witnesses, who are barred
from government jobs and refused business permits or identity cards.”125 Jehovah’s Witnesses
are held to such a brute level of isolation and imprisoned because they refuse to enlist in the
military service due to their religion. According to the Center on Conscience and War, many
Jehovah Witnesses refer to Isaiah 2:4 within the scripture that says, “They will have to beat their
swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning shears. Nation will not lift up sword against
nation, neither will they learn war any more” (Isaiah 2:4). 126 If a citizen refuses to join a military
service and the possibility of war, they are unable to fulfill their civic duty in Eritrea. This goes
against the cultural norm of placing the collective over the individual, which is represented in the
Nakfa Principles. This does not defend the lack of freedom of religion in Eritrea; however, it
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offers an interesting perspective as to why the government may selectively allow certain forms of
worship over others. In 2013, the United Nations published Sheila Keetharuth’s Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, which contained disclosed
observations from Eritrean refugees’ experiences in Eritrea. Within her report, Keetharuth writes,
“Those interviewed reported that the Government interferes in the internal matters of recognized
religions through controls and invasive policies, including the lack of provisions for exemption
from military service for conscientious objection.”127 The draconian levels of suppression
discovered within documents covering human rights injustices like Keetharuth’s report lack
consistent coverage from the international community, which enable the current situation. The
fear of religious persecution is yet another motivator for some of those who flee Eritrea in hopes
of individual freedoms.
Suppression in the Form of Assembly:
The next civil and personal liberty that requires critical evaluation is the right of
assembly. In many democratic nations, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of
association can be observed in the form of meetings, protests, etc. These rights are reflected in
Article 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights128. Despite the
international law, there are no non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society
organizations nor independent organizations allowed that are not affiliated with the authorities.129
One of the main assemblies of Eritreans recognized abroad is the Young People’s Front for
Democracy and Justice (YPFDJ), which answers directly to the PFDJ and advances the
Keetharuth, Sheila. 2013. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Eritrea,”
United Nations General Assembly. Accessed April 26, 2017,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.53_ENG.pdf
128 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations Human Rights. Accessed April 26,
2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx
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legitimacy of the government across borders. For a nation without checks or balances, NGOs,
independent institutions and civil society allow citizens a capacity to keep their governments
liable to the people’s needs. Ultimately, these institutions reduce corruption by conducting on the
ground research/fieldwork that shape government policies and development through policy
recommendations and international coverage of clandestine issues pertinent to advancing or
improving living conditions and as a result, human rights.
By banning these independent institutions, the state of Eritrea is strengthening its label as
a surveillance state and consequently inciting fear in its people. These conditions have invoked
thousands of Eritreans to defect, but not all within the country have the ability to flee. This
leaves the most vulnerable population at a crossroads, to continue life within the perimeters of
Eritrea or to flee to the neighboring countries of Sudan or Ethiopia, without certainty of a better
quality of life. By operating as a state that does not answer to its constituents, Eritrea contradicts
internationally recognized limitations of power, garnering international attention and sanctions
when most convenient for world superpowers like the U.S in 2009 in the case of Al-Shabaab130.
These untimely restrictions fuel the regime’s hold on its locals and diaspora, defending the need
for securitization while simultaneously promoting the “us vs. them”131 narrative. Additionally, it
provides momentary lapses of validation to government supporters in the diaspora communities
that promote the government’s need to stronghold the nation. Although these views are widely
accepted by members of YPFDJ, they do not encapsulate the slue of ongoing criticisms voiced
“Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Eritrea over its Role in Somalia, Refusal to Withdraw Troops
Following Conflict with Djibouti,” 2009. United Nations. Accessed April 26, 2017,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm
131 During the liberation war, global powers supported Ethiopia with weapons and resources, which made the
30 years war (1961-1991) especially grueling due to the lack of support. Post-liberation and through its
Nakfa Principles, the state of Eritrea has maintained its self-reliant narrative and has limited allies in the
international communities as well as its acceptance of foreign aid. “Us vs. them” depicts the framework that
has arisen prior to liberation and remains post-liberation that the international community is not concerned
with the survival of the nation or its people. There is a national pride and unity that is attributed to being
Eritrean because the nation attained independence ‘Against All Odds’ (which became the slogan of the war).
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by the crusaders of justice and human rights like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and individual activists, hoping to expose violations of liberties and investigate the widespread
fear. Eritrean communities worldwide are split between those who support the regime and
identify as Shabait,132 and those who oppose the regime – many who often remain silent to avoid
being deemed a traitor or worse, ‘Weyane’133.

Within Eritrea, there is no opposition

community or collective of dissidents as present in the diaspora. Those that oppose the
government do so in silence because of the widespread fear of covert reporters in plain sight. The
next medium of suppression necessary to critique is the challenges deserters’ families face in
government discovery of draft evaders and defectors. Through this method, the ways in which
fear transpires and exacerbates the reign of the government and the generational distrust that
arises in response.
Suppression in the Form of Punishing Deserters’ Families:
The 2001 crackdown on Eritrea’s free press combined with the 2002 Warsay-Yikaelo
Campaign fueled the mass exodus of Eritrean peoples that soon realized conscription would
extend far past its 18-month promise. There are no official policies that denote the punishment of
those related to defectors or draft evaders; however, the spread of rumors, allegations, and forced
remittances have led locals and scholars to associate the consequences that remain with the
deserters’ families. In fact, Bozzini writes about the state in Eritrea between 2005-2012, “A new
and unforeseen repressive measure was introduced whereby the police took into custody parents

During the liberation war, the members of the ELF were Jebha and the EPLF were Shabait. As the state of
Eritrea was founded through the EPLF that transformed into PFDJ, Shabait has been upheld as those in favor
of the government. Shabait, which means the people in the masses in Tigrinya, has origins in Arabic (sha’ab).
133 When used in reference to an Eritrean (instead of an Ethiopian), Weyane is a derogatory term because it
distinguishes the Ethiopian (Tigray) forces that have historically posed a threat to the livelihood of Eritreans.
To call an Eritrean ‘Weyane’ is to denounce his or her identity and right to claiming the liberation that has
affected every Eritrean family.
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whose children were alleged to have defected from the national service.”134 This was not the only
method of punishment that families faced. In many cases, there were additional taxes levied
against families, many whom already lacked the capacity to sustain themselves. “Paying off
50,000 Nakfa to the local administration was the sine qua non condition for releasing a family
member from custody.”135 With an informal and inconsistent practice of penalization,
punishment became open to speculation and rumors within the public. The austerity has been
normalized, leaving little to no alternatives to obeying fines or punishments and abiding by the
status quo.
Fear, Generational Distrust and Dissent:
Speculation and rumors have a grave impact on the Eritrean locals and diaspora because
they allow the government’s reign to surpass concrete legal declarations and policies,
unintentionally granting it an omnipresent presence. The legitimacy and jurisdiction of the
administration becomes fluid because the authorities’ wield is distorted by imagination or rumors
that stems from exacerbating pre-existing fears.136 This is not to invalidate the fears and lived
experiences of Eritreans that must flee to survive, yet it aims to showcase how pervasive the grip
of the government and its instruments of fear that have seeped into communities locally and
overseas. Furthermore, the inability to confirm the root of suspicions and penalties amongst
dissenters, deserters’ families, and those unfairly imprisoned has led to distrust socially.
“Accurate or not, such interpretations caused social ruptures among fellow citizens by supporting
the idea that the state could intrude into personal relation.”137 How can Eritreans fully engage in
their communities while filtering any speech that can be interpreted or morphed into opposition
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sentiments? How can a citizen offer criticism and hold his or her government accountable if
there are understood repercussions to voicing unpopular opinions? There is a level of
helplessness followed by submissiveness that evolves with suppression that infiltrates multiple
sectors of everyday life.
In its local context, Eritreans are unable to mobilize for a plethora of inhibitors, not
limited to the aforementioned lack of freedoms of press, religion and assembly. Fear is one of the
most powerful deterrents that international relations scholars have proven through examples in
game theory such as the prisoner’s dilemma138. With a population entrenched in fear, stagnation
is the safer alternative to mobilizing a public meeting of dissent when unrestricted assembly is
outlawed. Similar behavior applies to publicly expressing disdain towards authorities or
governance.
Abroad, Eritreans who wish to hold citizenship, own property and travel freely upon
return to Eritrea must submit remittances in the form of the infamous 2 percent tax, which the
government relies heavily on. In fact, Bozzini reports, “Channeling hard currency from the
Eritreans in the diaspora, who are increasingly refusing to support the state, is certainly one of
the current challenges that the Eritrean leadership is facing.”139 Despite the resistance with the
diaspora tax, some Eritreans abroad resist speaking negatively of the regime in public gatherings
because of the risk of covert surveillance. Poole writes, “The tax on Eritreans living abroad is
technically voluntary…however, refusal to pay this tax can have consequences for individuals
abroad and their families in Eritrea.”140 So while many can evade the tax as expatriates, those
with family living within the country or hoping to visit their homeland must comply with
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remittances to possess visas to enter and exit, purchase and maintain land, and reap the benefits
of an Eritrean citizen.
The majority of dissenters, similar to the activists in the Arab Spring, are composed of
the youth. The youth abroad that refuse the 2 percent tax can be interpreted as an act of rebellion
against the state. The youth of the Eritrean diaspora lack the stoicism of the liberation generation,
one of the greatest factors of the generational divide. The Eritrean youth within the country
defect as a means of opposing the state through placing the needs of the individual above the
existing culture of sacrificing one’s self or one’s comfort to compromise for the good of the
collective. Poole reports, “Recent escapees are treated as criminals if voluntarily repatriated to
the country, facing imprisonment and sometimes torture.”141 The remainder of Eritrean youth is
absorbed in national service and civil reconstructive positions assigned during conscription.
There is an immediate luxury that Eritreans in the diaspora harbor; the ability to critique and
express opinions of the government in a public forum without risk of immediate physical harm.
In Tunisia, the immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi was broadcasted through the media and
rapidly garnered international recognition through its visceral feeling of shock and sympathy. In
Egypt, the thousands of protestors in Tahrir Square communicated in masses through instant
communication via Facebook, Twitter and other forums of social media to organize and warn
protestors. In Yemen and Syria, news outlets like Al-Jazeera and other independently operated
press provided coverage during the ongoing civil wars. It is vital to recognize the level of access
to communication, lack of implementation of (indefinite) conscription, and the disparities in
resources accessible to the participants of the Arab Spring versus the people within Eritrea. The
argument is not which country had it worse, rather what factors are responsible for delaying
uprisings in Eritrea when it faces countless similarities as its regional Arab counterparts that
141
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were affected by the Arab uprisings. The presence of an authoritarian regime, lack of good
governance, restricted civil liberties, and desire for democracy alone are not always sufficient in
resulting in a change in government or civil unrest, as reflected in the current state of Eritrea.
In order for a revolution to take place in Eritrea, similar to the Arab Spring, those
speaking out against the injustices must be the local Eritreans. The Egyptian diaspora in the US
did not protest the government and set demands, nor did the Tunisian diaspora or any other Arab
diaspora – the oppressed groups within each respective nation mobilized and united in the midst
of crisis. The cries of Eritrean diaspora that were not born in Eritrea are often the only voices
given to the people, unintentionally overpowering the focus given to the local inhabitants. How
can we tell a story we have not lived through? There is a membership group for Eritreans abroad
that support the government, YPFDJ, but there are no other organized membership for those that
raise critiques or opposition. Although the current government would not easily accept an
opposition group, there could be an attempt to remain involved and enact change in the form of
non-political organizations. These non-political organizations could be dedicated to education,
access to resources, and the vast adversities disregarded and underfunded issues prevalent within
Eritrea.
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Conclusion
How does a country’s population decide to rebel? What conditions push citizens to their
breaking point? How long can one man rule before the people demand a change? What can be
said in the case of Eritrea when compared to the Arab Spring? To synthesize what has been
discussed through these chapters, one should review the primary factors of the Arab Spring, the
relevance of conscription in both the Arab Spring and Eritrea, as well as how the state of Eritrea
has constructed itself in the international community and amongst its citizens at home and in the
diaspora. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to consider the input of scholarship towards what
would have needed to arise in Eritrea to reach its regional counterparts and what policy
recommendations the regime and the people could implement moving forward.
The Arab Spring varied within each of the twelve nations it affected the most, yet each
respective nation’s population had common vehicles of dissemination (social media, independent
press, etc.) as well as the physical capacity to mobilize its citizens, especially the youth which
composed the majority of the nations involved. The culmination of declining economic
conditions, authoritarian regimes, censored media, tribal conflicts, disenfranchisement of
religious minorities, unemployment, and poverty were key factors in the revolutions and
organized protests that reached North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. No two countries
experienced the same uprising; however, there was a unifying presence amongst the people that
at the very least led to government changes if not protests. In the countries whose populations
did not succeed in revolting against the authoritarian rulers in place, the government used tactics
to suppress its dissidents, whether through passing appeasing legislation like in the cases of the
wealthier states of Algeria, Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait, or through cooperating with similar
regimes, which was visible of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where the former converted the crisis in
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Bahrain into a regional instability. In the case of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the need to end the
cycle of authoritarian rulers, corruption, discrimination, and poverty reached unbearable levels
and sparked mass dissidence. Behind the unrest of civil war in Yemen and Syria, the countries
within North Africa experienced some of the most gruesome responses from the militarized
authorities but they did not deter the efforts of the Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans. The shared
goal of attaining freedom, equality, and justice for those continuously neglected by the
government fueled the resistance and eventual prevail/triumph.
During the liberation war, Eritreans shared the same vision of attaining freedom, equality
and justice in the form of a sovereign Eritrea, free from the reign of Western colonizers, imperial
forces and its long-standing neighbor/enemy Ethiopia. Two decades after the fighting and the
EPLF has transformed into a monolithic apparatus in the form of the PFDJ, the only allowed
political state within the nation. Within this time frame leading up to the Arab Spring, Eritrea had
regularly conscripted civilians at the age of 18, yet terms of service had surpassed initial
promises. Although the rest of the countries in North Africa also had obligatory forms of
conscription, no country held nearly as restrictive confinements with a lack of sustainability or
opportunity to revisit the public sector post-service. Unlike its regional counterparts, Eritrea’s
government created a calculated system in which Eritrea’s youth would have to complete their
final year of post secondary education in a far removed location, normalizing conscription as a
necessary aspect of service to one’s country. Although Eritrea’s populations pales in comparison
to its Arab-speaking neighbors, it has had the most success in subscribing its citizens into lifelong reconstructive assignments and triggering a refugee exodus from those who wish to have a
life outside of stoicism.
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The Arab Uprisings and those who flee Eritrea share traits of resisting authoritarian rulers
with omnipotent capacities within their borders. With respect to Eritrea, flight is a direct
response to suppression of civil and individual liberties, not limited to religion, press and media,
assembly, expression and conscription. In a nation unaccountable to its constituents, those in
Eritrea are subject to the mercy of authorities and live in fear of clandestine or covert groups
incognito. Comparatively, suppression of foreign media and lack of secularism were present in
the Arab nations that experienced political and social upheaval. The main difference between the
countries that successfully took to the streets versus Eritrea is the physical capacity of those with
a lack of individual rights to protest the only government to exist post-liberation.
First and foremost, the political structures of governance within Eritrea require
constructive evaluation. The border war is no longer active and the need for mobilized military
efforts has severely declined. In order to restore faith and due diligence within the Eritrean
people, the country’s officials must cater to the needs of the immediate persons it aims to serve.
The purpose of the government is to maintain order and security within its populous, but with
ongoing repression in the form of national service, the nation’s population is drastically
reducing. If at least 5,000 Eritreans are fleeing their homes every month, there is an interpreted
imminent danger sparking their departures.
In a country that lacks sustainability, consistent electricity, significant foreign aid to
stimulate economic progression, developed rural areas, as well as a government that strongholds
its citizens, it is difficult to articulate what would have been needed to achieve similar levels of
success as its Arab regional counterparts. Eritrea was involved in a bloody war barely a decade
before the Arab Uprisings. Eritrean citizens had grown exhausted by the ongoing conflicts with
Ethiopia and the growth of casualties and unrest. History and border disputes allowed President
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Isaias Afewerki to construct an existential threat that put Eritrea at risk. These grievances led to
the implementation of the Warsay Yikaelo Campaign in 2002, which is responsible for the
ongoing mobilization of Eritrean conscripts.
After reviewing the current conditions in Eritrea, there are a few alterations that could
benefit the people of Eritrea and its diaspora communities. There has not been a free or fair
election, or any election for that matter, since the U.N. supervised referendum in 1993. Not only
are elections within the nation overdue, but the stronghold invested in unitary political party
must be revised. Without an alternative to the head of the state, the international community
recognizes extended leadership as a dictatorship or authoritarian regime, which damages the
level of cooperation and economic opportunity available from the international community.
There must be an end to indefinite conscription; openness to political discourse; investment in
education; and access to sustainable resources and subsidies provided to those in rural and poorer
areas. Not only are there needs economically to bolster the state of the country, but there are
needs for reform where current suppression exists. Without independent media, the government
damages its own credibility and draws attention to the secretive structures within the parameters
of Eritrea. Additionally, the freedom of religion is a human right that should not be dictated by a
governing power. One’s religious beliefs are able to be separate from political and economic
policies. Fear and the inability to mobilize disqualified Eritreans from being able to participate in
the Arab Spring as the Eritrean government’s restrictiveness on its people made rebellion seem
incomprehensible.
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